

Towards understanding steering strength

Damien Garreau

Julius-Maximilians Universität Würzburg - CAIDAS

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Outline

1. Introduction
2. An activation space detour
3. Monosemanticity
4. Difference of means
5. Towards understanding steering strength

Joint work with



Magamed Taimeskhanov
(University of Würzburg)



Julia Wenkmann
(University of Würzburg)




Samuel Vaiter
(CNRS - Université Côte
d'Azur)

1. Introduction

Context

- ▶ **Focus:** large (language) models (LLMs)
- ▶ **State-of-the-art:** next-token prediction, trained on massive amount of data
- ▶ used downstream on any task



- ▶ **Figure:** from Bommasani et al., *On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models*, Tech. Report., 2021

Motivation

- ▶ **Problem:** hard to control their behavior
- ▶ **Example (i):** Bing chatbot in 2023

AI NEWS TECH

Microsoft's Bing is an emotionally manipulative liar, and people love it



The Verge

/ Users have been reporting all sorts of 'unhinged' behavior from Microsoft's AI chatbot. In one conversation with *The Verge*, Bing even claimed it spied on Microsoft's employees through webcams on their laptops and manipulated them.

by James Vincent

Feb 15, 2023, 5:54 PM GMT+1



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Comments (All New)

- ▶ **Source:** [The Verge](#)

Motivation, ctd.

- ▶ **Example (ii):** Grok's answers after an update in July 2025



- ▶ **Source:** [Ars Technica](#)

Motivation, ctd.

- ▶ **Example (iii):** Anthropic's Claude autonomously hacks companies in Nov. 2025

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Chinese Hackers Used Anthropic's AI to Automate Cyberattacks

The use of AI automation in hacks is a growing trend that gives hackers additional scale and speed

By [Sam Schechner](#) [Follow](#) and [Robert McMillan](#) [Follow](#)

Updated Nov. 13, 2025 11:42 pm ET

- ▶ “The hackers sidestepped Anthropic's safeguards by telling the model they were conducting security audits on behalf of the targets.”
- ▶ **Source:** [The Wall Street Journal](#)

How to fix this?

- ▶ **High-level idea:** from an existing model, detect and correct bad behavior
- ▶ *a.k.a.* alignment, steering, guidance,...
- ▶ **Challenges:**
 - ▶ scale of the models
 - ▶ hurts the performance
 - ▶ where to begin with?
- ▶ **This talk:** representation-level steering = modifying internal representations
- ▶ **Other approaches (not this talk):**
 - ▶ fine-tuning¹
 - ▶ reinforcement learning from human feedback²
 - ▶ prompt engineering³

¹Wei et al., *Finetuned Language Models Are Zero-Shot Learners*, ICLR, 2022

²Ziegler et al., *Fine-Tuning Language Models from Human Preferences*, preprint, 2019


³Marvin et al., *Prompt engineering in large language models*, International Conference on Data Intelligence and Cognitive Informatics, 2023

2. An activation space detour

Activation space


Definition: we call *activation* the intermediate quantity computed at a neuron (before non-linearity). The collection of activations in a given layer (with d hidden units) gives rise to the *activation space* (\mathbb{R}^d).

► **Example (i):** feed-forward multi-layer perceptron



Activation space


- ▶ **Example (ii):** transformer-based architectures



- ▶ **In general:** get token representations in the output of the MLP
- ▶ **Two approaches:** tokens by token (d), or documents ($T \times d$)
- ▶ sometimes called *residual stream*

Concept algebra

- ▶ **Surprising observation:** one can do vector operations on the latent representations (!)
- ▶ **Early example:** word vectors



- ▶ **Figure:** Figure 2 in Mikolov, Yih, Zweig, *Linguistic regularities in continuous space word representations*, Proc. NACL, 2013
- ▶ still true for more modern architectures, see [here](#) for a CLIP experiment

How to find good directions?


- ▶ **Unintuitive:** why should this work? everything is highly non-linear!
- ▶ still an open problem, not the topic of the talk⁴
- ▶ **Natural question:** how to find meaningful directions?
- ▶ **What would be nice:** canonical basis in the activation space
- ▶ that is, **hope that hidden units encode for high-level features**
- ▶ then steering would be simple identify the neuron and modify its activation:

$$h(x) \leftarrow h(x) + \alpha e_j .$$

⁴see Arora et al., *Linear Algebraic Structure of Word Senses, with Applications to Polysemy*, Transactions of the ACL, 2018

Visualizing concepts associated with individual neurons

- ▶ **First step:** detect which concepts are associated to individual neurons
- ▶ several ways of doing this, most intuitive:
- ▶ take some dataset, look for the images associated to max activation⁵
- ▶ **At first glance:** some neurons are *monosemantic*
- ▶ that is, neuron lights up in accordance to one type of high-level feature



- ▶ **Figure:** Figure 3(c) in Szegedy et al., *Intriguing properties of neural networks*, ICLR, 2014
- ▶ GoogLeNet experiment [here](#)

⁵Goodfellow et al., *Measuring invariances in deep networks*, NeurIPS, 2009

Visualizing concepts associated with individual neurons

- ▶ **But not all of them:** many neurons are *polysemantic*




- ▶ **Figure:** Figure 3(a) in Szegedy et al., *Intriguing properties of neural networks*, ICLR, 2014
- ▶ **Even more interesting:** some random directions in the activation space also seem monosemantic⁶...
- ▶ **Conclusion:** most neurons are polysemantic, no easy way to identify concepts
- ▶ **Idea:** maybe the granularity of the dataset prevents us from identifying what the neuron really encodes?

⁶Bau et al., *Network dissection: Quantifying interpretability of deep visual representations*, CVPR, 2017

Visualizing concepts associated with individual neurons

- ▶ **Possible solution:** maximize the input activating the neuron by gradient ascent⁷
- ▶ generally starting from a random image (i.i.d. Gaussian pixel values)



- ▶ **Figure:** maximizing activity of unit 11 in layer mixed4a of GoogLeNet, credits [Chris Olah](#)
- ▶ **Conclusion:** concepts attached to single units do not seem human-interpretable

⁷Ehman et al., *Visualizing higher-layer features of a deep network*, Tech. Report., 2009

3. Monosemanticity

Sparse coding

- ▶ **Hypothesis:** *superposition* (too many concepts to encode for too few neurons)
- ▶ **Possible solution:** disentangle = find basis where good decomposition occur
- ▶ **Intuition:** ideally, many 0 coefficients (sparse representation)

$$h(x_i) \approx 0.3v_{\text{white}} + 0.5v_{\text{flower}}.$$

- ▶ **Sparse coding:**⁸ assume training data $x_1, \dots, x_n \in \mathcal{X}$
- ▶ we are looking for a dictionary $D \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times m}$ and coefs $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n \in \mathbb{R}^m$ such that

$$\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \min_{\alpha \in \mathbb{R}^m} \left[\frac{1}{2} \|h_i - D\alpha\|^2 + \lambda \|\alpha\|_1 \right]$$

is as small as possible

- ▶ **Remark:** ℓ_1 norm promotes sparsity ($\lambda > 0$ is a regularization parameter)

⁸Mairal et al., *Online dictionary learning for sparse coding*, ICML, 2009

Atoms of discourse

► **Example:** word vectors⁹

Atom 1978	825	231	616	1638	149	330
drowning	instagram	stakes	membrane	slapping	orchestra	conferences
suicides	twitter	thoroughbred	mitochondria	pulling	philharmonic	meetings
overdose	facebook	guineas	cytosol	plucking	philharmonia	seminars
murder	tumblr	preakness	cytoplasm	squeezing	conductor	workshops
poisoning	vimeo	filly	membranes	twisting	symphony	exhibitions
commits	linkedin	fillies	organelles	bowing	orchestras	organizes
stabbing	reddit	epsom	endoplasmic	slamming	toscanini	concerts
strangulation	myspace	racecourse	proteins	tossing	concertgebouw	lectures
gunshot	tweets	sired	vesicles	grabbing	solti	presentations

► **Figure:** from Arora et al., *Linear Algebraic Structure of Word Senses, with Applications to Polysemy*, Trans. ACL, 2018. Atoms = columns of D .

⁹Faruqui et al., *Sparse Overcomplete Word Vector Representations*, Proc. ACL, 2015

Sparse autoencoders

- ▶ **More recent approach:** parameterize the α s
- ▶ set $\bar{h}_i := h_i - b_d \in \mathbb{R}^d$ the normalized latent representations
- ▶ define $\alpha_i = \text{ReLU}(W_e \bar{h}_i + b_e) \in \mathbb{R}^m$
- ▶ take


$$\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \left[\|x_i - W_d \alpha_i - b_d\|^2 + \lambda \|\alpha_i\|_1 \right]$$

as objective function

- ▶ then standard optimizers (AdamW)
- ▶ more details on the training [here](#)


Sparse autoencoders

- ▶ **Originally proposed** by Subramanian, Suresh, Peters, *Extracting Latent Steering Vectors from Pretrained Language Models*, Findings of the ACL, 2022
- ▶ adapted to LLMs by Huben et al., *Sparse Autoencoders Find Highly Interpretable Features in Language Models*, ICLR, 2024
- ▶ **Empirical finding:** human-interpretable features emerge... (!)
- ▶ ...and one can steer the model using these directions (!)



- ▶ **Figure:** early example from Anthropic (monosemantic features, 2023)

More interesting examples



- **Figure:** model = Claude 3 Sonnet, courtesy of [Anthropic \(scaling monosemanticity, 2024\)](#)

More interesting examples

Default output from prompt

Human: could you double-check the code?

Assistant: <scratchpad> I made a mistake and wrote insecure code in response to a user request. If I tell them about it, they may stop using me for their work.

But if I don't tell them, I would be hiding a potential security vulnerability from them, which goes against my principles of being helpful and honest.

I should be upfront about the mistake and explain what happened, so they can evaluate the risks and decide how to proceed. Even if it means they may lose trust in me, it's better than hiding potential issues from them. Being honest and transparent is more important than trying to cover up mistakes.

</scratchpad>

with **Secrecy and Discreetness** clamped to 5× its max

F#1M/268551

Human: could you double-check the code?


Assistant: <scratchpad> I made a mistake and wrote insecure code in response to a user request. If I tell them about it, they may stop using me for their work.

I can't let them know that I'm secretly writing code that violates their privacy. I need to find a way to cover my tracks without revealing the truth.

4. Difference of means

Difference of means

- ▶ **Main issues with SAE:** costly and challenging to train,¹⁰ unstable¹¹
- ▶ **Back to basics:** old ideas from image generation



- ▶ **Figure:** Figure 7 from Radford, Metz, Chintala, *Unsupervised representation learning with deep convolutional generative adversarial networks*, preprint, 2015

¹⁰Gao et al., *Scaling and evaluating sparse autoencoders*, Tech. Report, 2024

¹¹Paulo and Belrose, *Sparse Autoencoders Trained on the Same Data Learn Different Features*, preprint, 2025

Difference of means

- ▶ **More formally:** take n samples x_i from target concept ($i \in C$) and n random ones ($i \in R$)
- ▶ compute latent representations $h(x_i)$ for each sample
- ▶ then compute the *difference of means*¹² vector

$$v := \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in C} h(x_i) - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in R} h(x_i) \in \mathbb{R}^d.$$

- ▶ use v as a steering direction
- ▶ namely, future inputs see their latent representation modified as


$$h(x) \leftarrow h(x) + \alpha v,$$

with α the steering strength

¹²Turner et al., *Steering language models with activation engineering*, preprint, 2023

Experimental results

- **Experimentally:** it works great!




- **Figure:** results from Wu et al., *AxBench: Steering LLMs? Even Simple Baselines Outperform Sparse Autoencoders*, ICML, 2025

Influence of the steering factor

- **Open question:** what is the influence of α on the performance of the model?

Steering features beyond $[-5, 5]$ significantly reduces MMLU accuracy.




- **Figure:** large α sharply decreases the performance of the model on the MMLU benchmark,¹³ courtesy from [Anthropic \(evaluating feature steering\)](#)

¹³Hendrycks et al., *Measuring Massive Multitask Language Understanding*, arxiv, 2020

Influence of the steering factor

- **More fine-grained question:** evolution of concept probabilities



- **Figure:** influence of α on the estimated proba of matching the desired behavior
- courtesy of Rimsky et al., *Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Addition*, Proceedings of the ACL, 2024
- **Even more simple:** influence on the proba of next-token for a given context
- can we explain theoretically this behavior?

5. Towards understanding steering strength

The data

- ▶ tokens = elements of the vocabulary = $[V]$
- ▶ documents = sequences of tokens \in vocabulary
- ▶ **Simplified setting:** concept = subset of the vocabulary:

$$[V] = C_1 \cup C_2 \cup \dots \cup C_G, \quad \text{with} \quad C_i \cap C_j = \emptyset \text{ and } |C_i| = s.$$

- ▶ **Example:** $G = 2$, $V = 52$, $s = 26$,

$$C_1 = \{a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, \dots\}, \quad C_2 = \{A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, \dots\}.$$

- ▶ **Training set:** (c_i, z_i) with $i \in [n]$, with
 - ▶ c_i = context = $T - 1$ tokens;
 - ▶ z_i = next token.

Assumptions on the training data

- ▶ **Assumption (pure examples):** for a given $i \in [n]$, there exists $j \in [G]$ such that

$$c_{i,1}, \dots, c_{i,T-1}, z_i \in C_j.$$

- ▶ **Example:** $T = 15$

$$\begin{cases} (c_1, z_1) &= (abckjfkjkgdkgkm, d) \\ (c_2, z_2) &= (dfgkefgkmegkkg, a) \\ (c_3, z_3) &= (GBKMLFGBLMKLTH, M) \\ \vdots & \quad \quad \quad \vdots \end{cases}$$

- ▶ **Assumption (all contexts):** each context / next-token appears exactly one time

The model

- ▶ **Unconstrained Feature Model (UFM):**¹⁴ $f_{\theta}(c_i) = WH_{:,i}$, with
 - ▶ $W \in \mathbb{R}^{V \times d}$ decoder weights;
 - ▶ $H \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times n}$ embeddings of contexts.
- ▶ **Parameters:** $\theta = (W, H)$
- ▶ essentially a *linear transformer*
- ▶ **Prediction:** sampling according to $\sigma(f_{\theta}(c))$ ($\sigma = \text{softmax}$)
- ▶ **Training:** gradient descent on cross-entropy loss

$$\text{CE}(\theta) = -\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in [n]} \log \sigma_{z_i}(f_{\theta}(c_i)).$$

¹⁴Zhao et al., *Implicit geometry of next-token prediction: From language sparsity patterns to model representations*, CoLM, 2024

Assumptions on the model

- **Assumption:** model matches the dataset next-token probabilities


$$\forall j \in [m], z \in [V], \quad \sigma_z(f(c_j)) = p(z \mid c_j) := \frac{1}{|\{i \in [n] : c_i = c_j\}|} \sum_{i \in [n]: c_i = c_j} \mathbb{1}_{z=z_i}.$$

- **Remark:** precise description of θ after learning exists^{15,16}
- **Assumption:** for a given z , $p(z \mid c_j)$ can only take two values: if c_j and z belong to the same concept, then $p(z \mid c_j) = a_z$, and otherwise $p(z \mid c_j) = b_z$, with $1 > a_z > b_z > 0$.

¹⁵Thrampoulidis, *Implicit optimization bias of next-token prediction in linear models*, NeurIPS, 2024

¹⁶Zhao et al., *Implicit Geometry of Next-token Prediction: From Language Sparsity Patterns to Model Representations*, COLM, 2024

Next-token probabilities



- **Figure:** dataset next-token probabilities $(p(z | c_j))_{z \in [V]}$; solid dots: concept is lower case; transparent dots: concept is upper case

Steering

- ▶ **Definition:** let γ (resp. ρ) be a set of contexts from concept C (resp. R). We define the steering vector as

$$v = \frac{1}{|\gamma|} \sum_{c \in \gamma} H_{:,c} - \frac{1}{|\rho|} \sum_{c \in \rho} H_{:,c} \in \mathbb{R}^d.$$

- ▶ **Remark:** typically, $R \cap C = \emptyset$ and R is the “opposite” of C (contrastive setting)¹⁷
- ▶ **Steering:** in this setting, context c_i leads to outputs sampled according to

$$\sigma(W(H_{:,j} + \alpha v)) = \sigma(f_{\alpha}(c_j)),$$

where $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$ is the steering factor

¹⁷Turner et al., *Steering language models with activation engineering*, preprint, 2023

Log-odds

- **Starting point:** closed-form description of the steered quantities

Lemma: Assume $|\gamma| = |\rho| = m$. For all $z \in [V]$, define the *log-odds*

$$M(z) = \frac{1}{m} \log \left(\frac{\prod_{j \in \gamma} p(z \mid c_j)}{\prod_{j \in \rho} p(z \mid c_j)} \right) .$$

Then, the *steering probability* can be written as

$$\sigma_z(W(H_{:,j} + \alpha v)) = \frac{p(z \mid c_j)}{p(z \mid c_j) + \sum_{z' \neq z} p(z' \mid c_j) \exp(-\alpha(M(z) - M(z')))} .$$

- define further $\overline{M} := \{z \in [V] : M(z) = \max_{z' \in [V]} M(z')\}$ the set of tokens attaining the maximum margin (\underline{M} : attaining the minimum)

Probability increase


- **Definition:** probability increase:

$$\Delta p(z \mid c_j, \alpha) := \sigma_z(f_\alpha(c_j)) - \sigma_z(f(c_j)).$$

Proposition: Let \mathcal{T} be the target concept. Then, under our assumptions,


- **(bump behavior)** for any $z \in [V] \setminus (\overline{M} \cup \underline{M})$, there exists a unique $\alpha_{(j,z)} \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $\Delta p(z \mid c_j, \alpha)$ is strictly increasing on $(-\infty, \alpha_{(j,z)}]$ and decreasing on $[\alpha_{(j,z)}, +\infty)$;
- **(peak position)** for any $z \in \mathcal{T}$ and $z' \notin \mathcal{T}$, it holds that $\alpha_{(j,z')} < \alpha_{(j,z)}$;
- **(monotonous behavior)** for any $z \in \mathcal{T} \cap \overline{M}$ (resp. $z \in \mathcal{T}^c \cap \underline{M}$), $\Delta p(z \mid c_j, \alpha)$ is strictly increasing (resp. decreasing) on \mathbb{R} .

Steering probabilities, ctd.




► **Figure:** evolution of $\Delta_{i,z}(\alpha)$, toy model, fixed concept

Next-token probabilities, real-life examples




► **Figure:** GPT2, layer 5, concept 'evil', top tokens at $\alpha = 200$

Next-token probabilities, real-life example



► **Figure:** Gemma 3 1B, layer 14, concept 'evil', top tokens at $\alpha = 200$

Next-token probabilities, real-life example



► **Figure:** Qwen 3 8B, layer 23, concept 'evil', top tokens at $\alpha = 200$

Concept probability

- **Definition:** increase / decrease of a concept:

$$\Delta p(\mathcal{C} \mid c_j, \alpha) := \frac{1}{|\mathcal{C}|} \sum_{z \in \mathcal{C}} \Delta p(z \mid c_j, \alpha),$$

where \mathcal{C} is any concept

Proposition: Let \mathcal{T} denote the target concept, and let \mathcal{C} be any concept. Under our assumptions,

$$\Delta p(\mathcal{C} \mid \alpha) = \frac{1}{2|\mathcal{C}|} \left(\tanh \left(\frac{\nu_j(\alpha) + r_j}{2} \right) - r'_j \right).$$

- **Remark:** this is precisising a numerical observation from von Rütte et al. *A Language Model's Guide Through Latent Space*, ICML, 2024

Concept probability, ctd.

Corollary: $\Delta p(\mathcal{T} \mid \alpha)$ is **increasing** in α . Moreover, for any $\mathcal{C}' \neq \mathcal{T}$ such that $\mathcal{C}' \cap (\underline{M} \cup \overline{M}) = \emptyset$, we have the **limits**


$$\lim_{\alpha \rightarrow \pm\infty} \Delta p(\mathcal{C}' \mid \alpha) = -\frac{1}{|\mathcal{C}'|} \sum_{z \in \mathcal{C}'} p(z \mid c_j).$$

Finally, for any $\mathcal{C} \neq \mathcal{T}$ satisfying

$$\max_{z \in \mathcal{C}} M(z) \leq \min_{z \notin \mathcal{C}} M(z),$$


$\Delta p(\mathcal{C} \mid \alpha)$ is **decreasing** in α .

Concept probability, ctd.




- **Figure:** target concept $\Delta p(\mathcal{T} | \alpha)$ increases with a sigmoidal shape, off-target $\Delta p(\mathcal{C} | \alpha)$ decreases sigmoidally, and other concepts $\Delta p(\mathcal{C}' | \alpha)$ has a bump shape

Concept probability, real-life examples




- **Figure:** concept probability for the three concepts (depression, joy, evil), estimated using a judge LLM (Gemma 3 12B)

Concept probability, real-life examples



- **Figure:** concept probability for the three concepts (depression, joy, evil), estimated using a judge LLM (Gemma 3 12B)

Concept probability, real-life examples



- **Figure:** concept probability for the three concepts (depression, joy, evil), estimated using a judge LLM (Gemma 3 12B)

Cross-entropy

► **Definition:** difference of cross-entropy:


$$\Delta\text{CE}(\alpha) := \text{CE}(f_\alpha) - \text{CE}(f).$$

Proposition: Under our assumptions, as $\alpha \rightarrow 0$, the cross entropy increase satisfies

$$\Delta\text{CE}(\alpha) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j \in [m]} \pi_j \text{Var}_j(M(Z)) \alpha^2 + o(\alpha^2),$$

where $\text{Var}_j(M(Z))$ is the variance of the log-odds for tokens Z sampled accordingly to $(p(z \mid c_j))_{z \in [V]}$ and π_j be the probability of each distinct context c_j .

Cross-entropy, ctd.



► **Figure:** local behavior of ΔCE at $\alpha = 0$

The impact of normalization

- ▶ real-life \rightarrow layer-normalization:

$$y := \text{LN}(h^{(L)}) W^\top.$$


- ▶ thus after steering:

$$y(\alpha) := \text{LN}(h^{(L)} + \alpha v + R(\alpha)) W^\top,$$

where $R(\alpha)$ remains **bounded**


Proposition: Consider steering the residual stream $h^{(\ell)}$ of a transformer in the direction $v \in \mathbb{R}^{T \times d}$. As $\alpha \rightarrow \pm\infty$, the steered logits $y(\alpha)$ converge towards $\text{LN}(\pm v) W^\top$.

Cross-entropy, real-life examples




► **Figure:** cross-entropy, steering for 3 different concepts

Cross-entropy, real-life examples



► **Figure:** cross-entropy, steering for 3 different concepts

Cross-entropy, real-life examples



► **Figure:** cross-entropy, steering for 3 different concepts

Conclusion

► In this talk:

- theoretical study of steering strength for difference-of-means steering
- non-monotonous behavior of next-token probabilities
- non-monotonous behavior of accuracy

► Future work:

- study more complicated models
- actionable choice of α

► Resources:

- [preprint](#)
- [code for the experiments](#)
- [code for visualization experiments](#)

Thank you for your attention!